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rAbstract
Focused on the impact of stringent intellectual property mechanisms over the uses
of plant agricultural biodiversity in crop improvement, the article delves into a
systematic analysis of the relationship between institutional paradigms and their
technological contexts of application, identified as mass selection, controlled
hybridisation, molecular breeding tools and transgenics. While the strong property
paradigm has proven effective in the context of major leaps forward in genetic
engineering, it faces a systematic breakdown when extended to mass selection,
where innovation often displays a collective nature. However, it also creates partial
blockages in those innovation schemes rested between on-farm observation and
genetic modification, i.e. conventional plant breeding and upstream molecular biology
research tools. Neither overly strong intellectual property rights, nor the absence of
well delineated protection have proven an optimal fit for these two intermediary
socio-technological systems of cumulative incremental innovation. To address
these challenges, the authors look at appropriate institutional alternatives which can
create effective incentives for in situ agrobiodiversity conservation and the equitable
distribution of technologies in plant improvement, using the flexibilities of the TRIPS
Agreement, the liability rules set forth in patents or plant variety rights themselves
(in the form of farmers’, breeders’ and research exceptions), and other ad hoc reward
regimes.Introduction
Within the more general Darwinian framework pertaining to the survival of the fittest
in the wild, agricultural practices have always exerted "an evolutionary pressure on
plants" (Kingsbury 2009). This pressure was initially characterised by the selection of
the most efficient plants by farmers in order to sow them the following year, and
intensified with the dawn of plant breeding, which metamorphosed crop improvement
into a knowledge-intensive, extremely productive and fast-evolving research-and-
development focused industry. As the domestication of plants epitomised the dawn of
agriculture, it took almost ten thousand years for grain production to reach the2014 Batur and Dedeurwaerdere; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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merely forty years’ later in 2000 (Khush 2001). Such impressive development is not as-
sociated with industrialisation, but rather with crop genetic improvement (Anderson
et al. 1988), which today indubitably stands as a sphere where returns on research in-
vestment remain "well above the returns attainable from alternative uses of funds"
(Byerlee 1996; Evenson 2001; Gardner 2003). Controlled plant improvement can con-
tribute to the achievement of sustainable agriculture and the alleviation of poverty by
ensuring yield gains and efficient resource management (Khush 2001) even though
other social, cultural, economic, environmental and policy factors may influence such
results (Evenson and Gollin 2003). Yet this success also depends to a great extent upon
the effective and equitable use of both wild and improved agricultural biological diver-
sity, which constitutes an indispensable input to the entire range of modern plant-
breeding science, and will likely play a growingly important role to tackle the challenges
of climate change and population growth. Studies show that, although most breeding
programmes remain based on former market successes, with 83 per cent of active se-
lection research being conducted on the basis of standardised and improved varieties
(Swanson 1997), researchers and breeders continue to utilise, and in fact depend upon
‘wild germplasm’ in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of their programs.
Around 6.5 per cent of their breeding gene pool is indeed continuously maintained
with wild species and “landraces” (Swanson 1997), defined by the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) as “domesticated plants adapted to the natural and cultural envir-
onment in which they live (or originated); usually possessing more diverse phenotypes
and genotypes than what is commonly referred to as a “breed”. Moreover, public and
private breeders alike rely on traditionally non-proprietary materials that have been,
and still may be, accessed through the international agricultural research community
under the umbrella of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR). For instance, it is estimated that 75 per cent of all maize sold by private
companies in Latin America in 1996 contained germplasm derived from material de-
veloped by CIMMYT, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre
(Morris and Lopez-Pereira 1999).
However, plant improvement faces a complex conundrum. Indeed, there is on the
one hand an essential need to grant artificial lead time for research efforts through the
recognition of intellectual property rights (IPR), in order to foster investment for the
development of innovations that are easily reverse-engineered and costly to develop.
While on the other hand, for follow-on innovators and cultivators, the prospects to use
material from the protected pool of improved varieties have become increasingly condi-
tional, with important detrimental effects, especially in a highly incremental innovation
sphere such as plant improvement (Maskus and Reichman 2005). Follow-on uses of
plant material or plant breeding techniques by farmers, breeders and scientists alike,
have become remarkably complex on account of the growing number of IPR bestowed
upon biological material or breeding techniques, especially following the adoption of
the TRIPS Agreement, laying out the foundations of the strong intellectual property
paradigm in its Article 27§3b. Furthermore, additional regulation on seed certification
and market regulation, defining the conditions of use and distribution of both pro-
tected and non-protected improved varieties, has accentuated the shrinking range of
manoeuvre left to those who operate or are pushed outside of such formal seed
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grade the genetic resources upon which improved varieties are built on, further stresses
the lack of regard for certain innovation systems. These detrimental aspects have led to
growing criticisms of the dominant intellectual property paradigm in plant improve-
ment, which have however not been very effective. Due to their piecemeal nature,
critics highlighting genuine insufficiencies related to various areas, such as in situ agro-
biodiversity, platform technologies and research tools or ex-situ pools of improved seed
varieties have not yet produced a major shift in the paradigm; nor have the proposed al-
ternative institutional tools been able to impose themselves as valid and viable institu-
tional mechanisms. What is missing in such piecemeal approaches to the institutional
effectiveness and/or defects of the protection of agrobiodiversity-related intangibles, in
our view, is a systematic analysis of the relationship between institutional paradigms,
such as intellectual property rights, and their context of application (Figure 1).
Our main hypothesis is that, in plant improvement, the opposition between the
market based strong intellectual property paradigm, and the public-domain oriented
fully-open angle as the main alternative paradigm, is too restrictive. We argue that the
analysis of the context of application of intellectual property rights can provide better
guidance for the future development of appropriate institutional alternatives to face the
problems of in situ agrobiodiversity conservation and for a more equitable distribution
of controlled hybridisation technologies and molecular biology research tools in plant
improvement. We also argue that these institutional alternatives can be found within
the flexibilities of either the TRIPS Agreement (allowing for effective sui generis protec-
tion of plant varieties, and loosely setting the contours of protection requirements), or
within IPR tools themselves in the form of liability rules, such as compulsory licensing
obligations, and also the farmers’, breeders’ and research exceptions. Liability rules haveFigure 1 Analysing paradigmatic fit: expected effects of the strong intellectual property paradigm and
partially open innovation in the main fields of application of plant improvement (figure by authors).
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stemming from the law of torts that involve a collective decision as to the value of the
entitlement (Calabresi and Melamed 1972), or as purely bilateral bargaining based ad
hoc rules that allow the concerned party to “take now and pay later” (Merges 1996).
But liability regimes have also been viewed and studied as a mixture of these two ap-
proaches. Such mixtures can take the form of stand-alone entitlements that offer alter-
natives to purely exclusive property rights, through either unwound intellectual
property entitlements or mandatory registration processes, which generally include au-
tomated licenses without the power to exclude and a specific modality of the “take
now, pay later” rules (Reichman 2000). Building upon this latter work, we argue that
this last type of liability regime can also be carved within codified yet unwound intel-
lectual property entitlements, where different trigger points are established ex ante for
compensation through prior user rights. That is why we consider that the defence
mechanisms that have been built into IPR systems to protect follow-on users against
infringement claims within a classical property-based entitlement regime also constitute
liability rules that determine in effect allocations and split asset entitlements (Burk
1999). They are in this sense “prior user rights” or “codified liability rules” within a
property regime, where either a compulsory license is set at zero royalty, or a trigger
for compensation is defined ex ante by the legislator (Burk 2009). To show the contri-
bution of this analysis, we use the lessons from universally acclaimed research on para-
digm breakdowns in science (Kuhn 1962), to investigate whether, in certain areas of
plant improvement technologies, a systematic series of breakdowns of the strong IP
paradigm have appeared, and, if so, to examine a number of proposed institutional
alternatives. To present the contribution of a systematic analysis of the relationship
between institutional paradigms and their context of application to the construction of
institutional and regulatory alternatives, the analysis in this paper will:
(1) briefly review the shortcomings of the strong intellectual property rights paradigm
in relation to certain technological evolutions, assessing the areas where this
paradigm clearly contributes to agrobiodiversity-based innovation, and those areas
where systematic or partial breakdowns are observed;
(2) analyse and propose the adjustment of the intellectual property paradigm for the
systematic and partial breakdowns witnessed in mass selection, controlled
hybridisation and the development of molecular biology research tools.Shortcomings of the strong intellectual property paradigm as applied to
plant improvement based on constant agrobiodiversity input
The design of alternative governance frameworks to promote the successful use of bio-
diversity in terms of efficiency, distribution and fairness, stems primarily from a single
interrogation; that of the adequacy of the currently prevailing IPR paradigm, charac-
terised by lenient patentability requirements and post 1991 enhanced plant variety
rights, vis-à-vis all ranges of innovative and sustainable uses of agrobiodiversity.
Responding chiefly to the needs of the increasingly intricate, knowledge-intensive, and
incrementally cumulative context of agrobiodiversity research and development, domi-
nated by molecular plant breeding and DNA recombination, the dominant strong IPR
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munity or farmer level, within both the public and private sectors. Our analysis is based
on the premise that rules defining the contours of protection and use of plant-related
innovations do not adequately correspond to the needs of the entire range of existing
agrobiodiversity innovation systems, on account of the characteristics of seeds them-
selves, but also on account of the specific features defining plant innovation relying on
the repeated use of agricultural biodiversity.Characteristics of seeds and plant improvement
Seeds embody an inherent duality, as they are not only commercial commodities in
their own right, but they also constitute an instrument for technology transfer through
their informational public good nature (Louwaars 2002), which farmers and breeders
alike daily seek to improve. Seeds cannot in this regard be merely viewed as inputs for
agricultural production, since the genetic resources they encompass also represent the
key inputs of agricultural research and development activities, as potential sources of
innovation. This feature has been enhanced through the infusion of science within trad-
itional mass selection activities, which designate the long-established crop improvement
techniques based on the observations, instincts and traditions of farmers (Gepts 2004).
Even today, farmers from developing or developed countries alike develop new farmers
varieties based on combinations of landraces, gene bank material and at times even im-
proved varieties (Salazar et al. 2007). Gradual scientific input into these mechanisms
has led to the appearance of methodical and controlled hybridisation, based on empir-
ical and systematic trial-and-error techniques, the detection of useful mutations and
the 'fixation' of desired characteristics such as disease resistance or flavour enhance-
ment through the deliberate crossings operated by plant breeders (Kingsbury 2009).
The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics at the beginning of the 20th century, opening
the prospect of unprecedented results in terms of yield, and introducing cultivators to
‘hybrid vigour’, has spread into the institutional structure of research and development
activities themselves, gradually opening the doors to private investment in crop im-
provement (Jaffee and Srivastava 1994). The agricultural research paradigm then broke
down once more, with the development of genomics science and our understanding of
life at a deeper level, that of the gene (Buttel et al. 1985). Even though most of the bio-
technological advances witnessed in the early 1980’s have supplemented and reinforced
the efficiency of conventional selection and hybridisation methods, they have moved
the molecular base of new plant breeding forward in an astonishing way (Murphy
2007), while genetic modification and DNA recombination techniques have unveiled
completely new horizons to the realisation of plant breeding’s promises (Kloppenburg
2004; Moose and Munn 2008). The two revolutions witnessed in relation to plant
improvement, pertaining first to our understanding of genetics and rules of heredity,
and second to the development of molecular biology and genomics science, have
considerably altered the agricultural research paradigm and industry structure (Barton
2003). Scientific progress has indeed driven the rise of the private seed sector through
the professionalisation of plant breeding, before igniting the reign of life-science giants
through the infusion of molecular plant breeding capacity into the industry, alongside
the vertical integration of technology-heavy start-ups.
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innovations first and foremost comprise a combination of knowledge disseminated
through a wide array of informational tools and products produced by different actors.
Crop genetic improvement is therefore essentially a process of derivation, whereby each
incremental innovative contribution (realised either through the selection of best per-
forming specimens on farms, through plant-breeding research relying on sexual or
asexual crosses, or through various biotechnological instruments and techniques) holds
the potential of becoming a commercial product. In this context, follow-on innovations
or improvements directly derived from an underlying creation or invention raise, as in
all "cumulative innovation chains", critical questions as to their degree of appropriabil-
ity and control, and thus their optimal treatment (Merges and Nelson 1990; Lemley
1997). In the light of this peculiar innovation chain based upon incremental steps,
rather than major leaps forward, steadily at the mercy of reverse-engineering, and the
intrinsic public good nature of biodiversity’s informational component, regulatory inter-
vention is inevitable for fostering investment in plant breeding, while ensuring the con-
servation of genetic variability. Such intervention needs nonetheless to be constructed
around a particularly intricate balancing act, having due regard to past contributors to
knowledge and biodiversity, as well as to future “borrowers” or developers of incremen-
tal knowledge and biodiversity, and thereby ensuring both prospects of appropriation
and access to innovations. The present dominant intellectual property paradigm,
characterised by extended patent protection and stringent plant-variety protection
granted within a strictly regulated formal seed market, raises the question as to whether
it has successfully achieved such a balancing act in the misunderstood world of agro-
biodiversity innovation.Plant improvement and IP: Patents or sui generis Plant Variety Protection
The recognition of statutory property rights over the informational content of im-
proved plant varieties was operated through the expansion of the scope of traditional
IP mechanisms’ protection, as well as the enactment of need-specific protection re-
gimes, so-called “legal hybrids” (Reichman 1994), derived from the same premises as
the traditional protection regimes (Boyle 2003). The reality and reach of such propri-
etary protection climaxed through the adoption of international minimum protection
standards in 1994 and Article 27§3b of the TRIPS Agreement, which quite uniquely
starts with negative obligations, by stating that: “Members may […] exclude from pat-
entability: […] plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially bio-
logical processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and
microbiological processes.” Acknowledging the controversies surrounding the definition
of patentable subject matter with regards to life sciences, the Agreement continues by
asserting that: “Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by pat-
ents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof”, thereby setting
the foundations of the strong intellectual property paradigm in plant improvement.
Patent protection
By encouraging the inventor to disclose innovative knowledge, while simultaneously
holding the rights to protect follow-on uses of inventions, patents avoid underinvest-
ment in costly but socially beneficiary research and development activities, while also
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so doing, they avoid some of the aggravated enclosure-related detrimental effects that
might follow from recourse to trade secrecy (Eisenberg 1997). Within this context, pat-
ents, as titles conferring exclusive rights to use, sell and control the exploitation of a
novel invention involving an inventive step and susceptible of industrial application,
actually grant the right to “prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from
making or using the product or process covered by the claim” (Article 28§1 TRIPS), and
are thus drafted as rights to exclude third parties. In accordance with Article 27§1 of
the TRIPS Agreement, “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products
or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application”, subject to the exceptions to patentabil-
ity set out by national legal orders. They can and have been granted intensively on bio-
logical material in accordance with the national patentability requirements where
protection is sought, mostly in developed countries and in particular the USA. The ex-
tension of patent claims to the life sciences, mainly attributed to the infamous Dia-
mond vs. Chakrabarty ruling of the US Supreme Court, had however been regular
practice in a number of European countries from the 1930s onwards (Straus 2003; Van
Overwalle 2006). The scope of patentability is today more intricately delineated, espe-
cially on the “old continent” (Europe), where plant varieties and essential biological
processes are excluded from protection, in accordance with Article 53§b of the
European Patent Convention as revised 29th November 2000 (also present in the 1973
text). Nevertheless, even with the more recent recourse to subject-specific regulatory
texts with relatively strong binding potency, such as the European Directive 98/44/EC
on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, defining the exact contours of
patentability exclusions with regards to biological material has become an increasingly
complex task. Indeed, the so-called “more than a single variety approach” upheld by
the European Patent Office in 1999 (Transgenic Plant/Novartis II ) has been effectively
extended by Article 4.2 of the aforementioned “Biotechnology Directive” 98/44/EC.
While the EPO accepted that plant varieties could fall within the scope of a claim, if
such claim did not cover a single plant variety, the Directive went on to assert that
“plants, animals and their separate parts [were] eligible for patent protection” (Chiarolla
2011). Likewise, the difficulty to determine the impacts of enlarged patentability scopes
on the access to essential research resources in various innovation chains is epitomised
by the daunting proportions taken by recent attempts at patent landscaping (such as
the CAMBIA rice genome landscape). These complexities, explaining the growing im-
portance of legal counsel in order to navigate and enforce protection titles, stems
mainly from the remarkable advent of biotechnology and the correlated expansion of
innovative breeding processes or tools retaining a biological character, yet constituting
important technological leaps forward, and therefore falling under patent protection,
especially with regard to molecular selection efforts involving a number of highly tech-
nical and non-microbiological steps (Kock 2007).
Plant variety rights protection
A relatively lesser-known intellectual property-rights system (outside those having re-
course to its instruments regularly), plant breeders’ rights (PBR) or plant variety protec-
tion (PVP), has been developed from 1961 onwards, with the enactment of the first
Batur and Dedeurwaerdere Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2014, 10:14 Page 8 of 29
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/10/1/14Convention under the auspices of the “International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants” (UPOV). The requirement set out in Article 27§3 of the TRIPS
Agreement does not make direct reference to the UPOV system, even though today it
seems to be considered as the main (if not the only) sui generis plant variety protection
system that is duly implemented and complied with in an effective manner (Llewelyn
2004). PVP titles, as envisaged within the UPOV system, confer a bundle of rights to
the developer of a novel combination of genes manifested as a distinct, uniform and
stable variety, aiming therefore at the phenotype of the variety, rather than its genotype
or its isolated biological components. These titles, offered under national or supra-
national legislation (as in the European Union through the Community Plant Variety
Office), require neither proof of an inventive step nor a specific utility, as they are solely
based on the evaluation of the variety’s value in terms of genetic quality, i.e. uniformity
and stability, and on the basis of phenotypic differences vis-à-vis “known” varieties. The
conditions for protection, formerly found in Article 6 of the 1961 and 1978 Acts with
slightly different wordings, now state, in accordance with Article 5 of the 1991 Act, that
“the breeder's right shall be granted where the variety is new, distinct, uniform and
stable”. According to Article 14 of the same instrument, the authorisation of the devel-
oper of the protected variety should be sought for “the production, reproduction, condi-
tioning for the purpose of propagation, offering for sale, selling or other marketing,
exporting, importing and stocking” of the propagated material. The exclusive rights
granted by such PVP titles are however surrounded by two major counter-conditions,
drafted in the shape of liability rules: the breeders' exemption and the farmers' exemp-
tion, evidencing the “tailored-for-purpose” nature of this protection mechanism.
The farmers' exemption, allowing farmers to sow seeds for saving, using or exchan-
ging, was in the past implied by the 1961 and 1978 Acts through the scope of protec-
tion granted to breeders (since the extent of exclusive rights did not reach acts
perpetrated without any commercial purpose by third parties, including unmethodical
selectors or farmers; Pires De Carvalho 2010). From such an exclusion from the scope
of protection, the farmers’ exemption has evolved into a formal yet optional exception
to the extent of the PVP title that may be granted at the national level for the use of
seeds on the farmers’ own holdings and with possible equitable remuneration to the
breeder, according to Article 15§2 the 1991 UPOV Convention. The breeders’ exemp-
tion, granting plant developers the possibility to use protected varieties in their breed-
ing programmes without prior consent from the title holder, had already been
formulated in the 1961 text of UPOV. Article 5 stated that the prior authorisation
requirement established “for production, for purposes of commercial marketing, of the
reproductive or vegetative propagating material, as such, of the new variety, […] shall
not be required either for the utilisation of the new variety as an initial source of
variation for the purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such
varieties”, except “when the repeated use of the new variety is necessary for the commer-
cial production of another variety”; a wording that remained unchanged in the 1978
Convention. Article 15§1 of the 1991 text now provides for a “compulsory exception”,
whereby the breeders’ right does not extend to “acts done privately and for non-
commercial purposes, for experimental purposes, and acts done for the purpose of
breeding other varieties”. The UPOV approach, as an instrument specific to the field of
incremental plant innovation, thereby takes due account of the characteristics of seed
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conventional plant breeding. However, both exemptions have been significantly restricted
in the 1991 text.Shortcomings of the property paradigm for addressing plant improvement
The inherently incremental nature of controlled plant improvement leads to the asser-
tion that major leaps forward would be much rarer than in other more classical fields
such as electrical engineering. Except for genetically engineered crops (transgenics),
leaps achieved in agrobiodiversity innovation chains therefore need to be stretched to
effectively qualify as "an inventive step" beyond the existing "prior art", and accordingly
open the door for exclusive monopoly under the patent paradigm (Reichman 2003).
The requirement of non-obviousness or of the existence of an inventive step found in
all national patent systems thus theoretically prevents the patentability of plant var-
ieties, unless the criteria for such patentability are revised or re-interpreted with lower
standards (Barton and Berger 2001). As in synthetic biology, a sphere that draws inspir-
ation from biotechnology, most of the innovations present in conventional or molecular
plant-breeding innovation chains constitute in too many ways a novel recombination of
already-existing components or varieties to be effectively protected under the historical
patent paradigm, developed for the purposes of inanimate and chemical rather than
self-replicating biological inventions (Rai and Boyle 2007). Nevertheless, even though
the obvious character of most plant-related process innovations is frequently
highlighted, the gene products of such methods may be considered as novel in the
current patent paradigm characterised by lenient patentability requirements. This ap-
proach creates extensive objections before competent Courts and Patent offices on the
damaging spectre of non-novel and broad biotechnology patents (Van Wijk 1995). In-
deed, while the exclusive monopoly rights awarded to the initial developer by patent
protection need to be “commensurate with the contributions to the state of the art”
(Straus 2003), such contributions may not be easily determined in those plant
improvement models that rely on biological processes. Drawing on the incremental
nature of plant innovation, the pivotal notions of prior art and novelty or non-
obviousness carry further cravings for vigilant consideration, as the currently domin-
ant intellectual property paradigm is considered to have enclosed what is by
definition not enclosable in cumulative innovation processes, while failing to duly
recognise past contributions, small or big, of previous germplasm users and con-
servers, urging calls for caution as to the possible "recycling of public knowledge for
private reward" (Drahos and Braithwaite 2003).
When analysing the magnitude of the rewards that can be attained through
innovation, especially within a cumulative cycle with few ground-breaking discoveries,
it should also be remembered that actors possessing restrictive monopoly rights have
the ability to "choose the optimal level of output for the intermediate good embodying
the patented technology" (Goeschl and Swanson 1999). The proliferation of strong and
broad foundational patents, designating not only one technological application but
encompassing a range of claims, is therefore thought to impede the entire research
community's range of action (Salazar et al. 2000). This could in turn potentially
threaten an innovators' inherent right to build upon another innovators' creation, and
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tions. As a consequence, fluctuating and fragmented patent landscapes significantly in-
crease the known and unknown costs of research and development, all the while
creating “a great deal of uncertainty in making product development and investment
decisions, which rely on a realistic ‘freedom to operate’ assessment", both within the
private and the public sectors (Henkel and Maurer 2009; Chi-Ham et al. 2010). Fur-
thermore, when competing firms hold patents on different components of a complex
technology (thereby creating a phenomenon that has been denoted "a patent thicket"),
and decide not to cross-license them, research and development activities can be slo-
wed down or even rendered impossible in an entire industry (Shapiro 2001). Examples
regarding delays in attaining research results, or simply conveying the difficulties in
gaining access to technologies or a small part of a complex technology are regrettably
numerous (Kingston 2001). Within the context of transgenic research, we may cite the
setbacks experienced by the relatively large American Cyanamid (since then acquired
by BASF) in product development due to the exclusive licensing agreement signed by
the "Biolistic Particle Delivery System" gene gun technology developer, Cornell Univer-
sity, towards the university researchers' own start-up company, Biolistics, which was
later bought by DuPont. Negotiations between the two companies failed, partially due
to their competitor status in a different product market, causing considerable delays in
Cyanamid's alternate product development cycle (Pray and Naseem 2005). Patents in
life sciences have indeed sometimes been used as trading currencies or bargaining
chips, as defensive means to prevent lock-outs caused by a competitors’ denial of access
to its invention, in contrast to simple technologies such as chemicals (Merges and
Nelson 1990; Kingston 2001). Another infamous example of so-called “blocking patents”
on complementary technologies, covering broad market segments and heavily affecting new
entrants (Merges 1994), relates to the development of pro-vitamin A-enriched ‘Golden
Rice’. This variety, developed upon a public-domain premise through the initiative of the
Rockefeller Foundation, required permission with regard to about 70 patents in the United
States, widening concerns vis-à-vis the sacrosanct "freedom to operate" in biotechnology-
backed plant-breeding activities, even though the patents were seemingly relinquished in
favour of the poor in this particular case (Kryder et al. 2000; Hope 2008).
In response to the potent need for effective protection of innovative products, faced
with the daunting prospect of rapid reverse-engineering, especially in the case of the
transgenics innovation system, the proprietary paradigm has thus been established and
gradually extended by public authorities to address forms of innovation that were not
traditionally protected under patent-like regimes, such as those stemming from con-
ventional or molecular plant breeding. However, these extensions reflect a generalised
and pervasive contraction of artificial lead times in cumulative incremental innovation
processes, thereby straining the regulatory system to its breaking point, and weakening
the competitive ethos upon which intellectual property rights continue to be based
(Reichman 1994).Institutional alternate tools: paradigmatic fit and responses to breakdowns
Acknowledging the shortcomings that emerge from the excessively restrictive and ex-
clusive rights embodied in the strong intellectual property paradigm, the limits around
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taking due account of the incorporeal nature of relevant innovations, the ease of
reverse engineering, and the colossal investments required for new developments.
Systems drawing from completely open-source models or from such understanding
would in this regard probably fail to deliver significant portions of socially, agronomi-
cally or environmentally meaningful innovations. Far from the pleas that have been as-
sociated with equity or piracy discourses, alternatives should be developed, recognising
the importance of the rules of access to innovation which characterise intellectual
property regimes, but also acknowledging the need to reward the contributions of both
previous and future stewards and users of agricultural biodiversity. Conceding that no
perfect trade-off between protection, access and diffusion can exist, the rights, privi-
leges and use conditions inherent in the current patent and PVP approaches may still
be adequately distributed in a more coherent regulatory framework which would at-
tempt to address the needs of all sub-systems of agrobiodiversity-reliant innovation.
Considering the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, i.e. the principle of an “effective
sui generis plant variety protection system” mentioned in Article 27§3, the recognition
of exceptions from patentability and protection scope, inter alia in Articles 27, 30 and
31, and the room provided for the regulation of licensing protocols (WIPO, World
Intellectual Property Organization 2011), we believe the task at hand hinges on experi-
menting in a more consistent manner with various models that build partially-open
innovation systems based on such flexibilities and on second tier liability rules. In this
article, we aim to show the contribution of such a complementary framework for
agrobiodiversity-based innovation, by looking in a more consistent way at a set of tools that
may address the cases of systematic breakdown (witnessed in Mass selection) and partial
breakdowns (where both proprietary and partial openness driven institutional approaches
may prove valuable, more specifically in Controlled hybridisation, and Molecular biology
upstream research tools).Mass selection
Cultivar selection and exchange on the margin of the strong IP paradigm
Farmers have been compelled to radically rethink their traditional production chain in
the light of the drastic changes occurring in agricultural production, first through the
technological revolutions that have instilled new high-performance inputs on farm, and
then through novel regulatory frameworks that have constructed ‘artificial’ boundaries
on the use of such inputs. Farmers had previously reproduced their seeds time and time
again, and exchanged those warily selected best-performing or best-fitting varieties with
other farmers. Even today, a large proportion of the seed planted worldwide is either
saved by farmers or exchanged on a farmer-to-farmer basis. In the mid-1980s farmer-
saved seed accounted for an estimated 35 per cent (or $18 billion) of the total estimated
value of $50 billion of all agricultural seed used worldwide, proprietary or not
(Groosman et al. 1988). In developing countries, the importance of seed-exchange net-
works and re-use is seemingly even greater, as an estimated 80 per cent of the seed
used in the early 1980s was farmer-saved (Pray and Ramaswami 1991). In addition to
the main vertically integrated innovation chain producing improved varieties, mass se-
lection operated on farms by farmers cannot thus be overlooked as an innovation
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also truly ensuring the subsistence of millions of farmers based on principles of open
access and informal exchanges. Mass selection operates on a daily basis even in devel-
oped nations, where a number of noteworthy initiatives have emerged. The French net-
work "AgroBio Périgord, Maison de la Semence", for instance, disseminates a technical
book on the multiplication and selection of maize and sunflower on farms to the 250
growers that take part in the Western France network. In order to conserve non-
proprietary agricultural biodiversity, they experiment on local populations or 'land-
races', selecting those individuals presenting similar characteristics after two or three
years of natural local adaptation, without ever falling under a stock of 600 individuals
(in order to avoid degeneration and maintain so-called "security stocks").
However, such selection and exchange networks need to re-situate themselves within
the technological and regulatory environments that currently surround their activities,
if they wish to sustain their endeavours without infringing other actors' intellectual
property rights. They are also faced with an additional complexity created by the legis-
lation surrounding the rights to distribute seeds in general, whether these are protected
through IPR or not. This age-old innovation model is indeed not only set aside by the
dominant appropriation and incentive mechanisms set out by IPR tools, but it is also
pushed into illegality by those rules solely pertaining to the regulation of the “formal”
seed market. Indeed, in most developed countries, and increasingly in developing
nations, seed distribution is only allowed after certification procedures based on the
distinctness, uniformity and stability of plant varieties (so-called DUS testing), and the
inclusion of either actors and/or varieties into official catalogues (Tripp and Louwaars
1997). While formal seed markets function on the basis of regulation pertaining to ap-
proval and promotion, with quality insurance and guarantee as to the identity, purity
and performance of purchased seeds, informal exchanges are governed by cultural
norms and ad hoc rules determined solely by the participants in the exchange, without
regulatory intervention (Lipper et al. 2009). Yet mass selectors are forced into illegality
by both seed marketing requirements and IP rights, while not being compensated for
their efforts to cultivate and upgrade biodiversity on farm. The possibility of farmers/
selectors infringing upon existing patent or plant variety rights remains extremely high,
depending on a wide range of circumstances relating to the national legislation in ques-
tion, as well as to the specific crop or the size of the farming enterprise. These factors
influence the recourse and range of the farmers’ privilege recognised under PVP laws.
In addition, the recourse to a wide array of enclosing instruments by innovators for a
single specific product (such as Round Up Ready canola), simultaneously protected
through process and gene patents, plant variety rights, trademarks and the private con-
tract that is the “Technology Use Agreement”, has further complicated the delineation
of the farmers’ privilege. The shrinking space for manoeuvre left to farmers for seed
saving, using and exchanging within the strong IP paradigm, and a seemingly general-
ised lack of awareness or training in legal issues on the cultivators’ side, have led to
mounting disagreements between variety developers and sowers, leading to numerous
court cases. Litigation has flourished over a range of IP infringements, from the posses-
sion of protected seed in itself, to its re-use outside the scope of the legislation, without
royalty collection or in larger farms than those targeted by applicable legislation. Fur-
thermore, mass selection has been increasingly tainted by illegitimacy indictments
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sumer protection and high productivity rates. While farmers are protected against
crooked seed distributors and impure seed lots by the establishment of official cata-
logues and clear insurance or liability regimes, the varieties they would perhaps want to
cultivate for agronomical, environmental or cultural reasons fail to meet the require-
ments of the stringent marketing rules of distinctness, uniformity and stability. Litiga-
tion has in this regard prospered, especially over the lack of equivalent certification
requirements for the commercialisation of conservation varieties, where the lack of
registration of farmers’ varieties in national catalogues has generally been ruled to be in
violation of the formal seed market rules (GNIS and FNPSPF vs. Kokopelli), and has re-
cently been seen as unfair competition (Tribunal of Grand Instance of Nancy, Graines
Baumaux vs. Kokopelli; cf. detailed discussion below).
Not only does the dominant paradigm push mass selection activities into the realms
of compulsory illegality, it also systematically fails to equitably acknowledge mass selec-
tion networks that are not given efficient tools to protect the products of their activities
and foster their own innovation model based on open access. Indeed, artificial lead time
is not provided to this model, thereby failing to address the market failures with regards
to this specific innovative process (Reichman 1994). Even though traditional exclusion
rights embedded in IP tools do not adequately fit the collective nature of innovation
based on mass selection, the diverse and unstable, yet locally adapted varieties ought to
be protected against subsequent re-appropriation by either other farmers or the indus-
try, and compensation should be triggered, in case of re-appropriation for instance, at
the commercialisation stage of new varieties incrementally developed by third parties.
The ability of farmers to develop new varieties based on mass selection is regrettably
still largely ignored by policy-makers, confronted with a regulatory conundrum where
protection should not only be granted to the conserved germplasm or created material,
but also appreciate the farmers’ “dynamic and collective system of technology develop-
ment and diffusion through every season”, based on skill sharing and seed exchange
(Pelegrina and Salazar 2011). The institutional characteristics of mass-selection efforts
therefore point towards a systematic breakdown of the strong exclusive-appropriation-
oriented paradigm with regard to this less technology-driven and more community-
oriented innovation system.
Models responding to the paradigm breakdown for mass selection
Mass selectors are faced with the double challenge of shrinking possibilities to re-use
protected improved varieties under more stringent PVP and patent legislation on the
one hand, and of shrinking possibilities to exploit their own uncertified farmers’ var-
ieties in the formal seed market on the other. As argued in this section, they may find
solutions in either farm saved seed regulation or in derogatory certification schemes,
which may include a second tier liability rules regime.A. Farmers’ exception and farm-saved seed regulation Until now, the main ap-
proach to allowing mass selection-based innovation to contribute to the sustainable use
of biodiversity on farms has been to situate the “traditional practices of farmers as
exceptions to the exclusive rights of plant breeders under existing IPR tools”. This pre-
cludes breeders from demanding payment from farmers who save and plant seeds saved
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farmers' exception or privilege, allowing farmers to sow seeds for saving, using or ex-
changing without the authorisation of the variety developer, as it was defined in the
first UPOV Conventions, allowed for farmers/selectors to use the diversity created by
breeders in their own selection routine. Although the 1978 Convention, being a mini-
mum standards agreement, granted opportunities for the more precise design of the
implicit rights’ contours at the national level and thereby more greatly limited non-
commercial uses, it should still be noted that under the practice of so-called
“brown-bagging” in accordance with this Act, farmers were even allowed to sell
limited quantities of protected seeds for reproductive purposes (Ghijsen 1998). Today, this
privilege, which could either be viewed as an exemption from infringement or as an
exception to the variety developer’s rights, has become formally conditional to elements
related to national circumstances, farm size and the necessity to use the seed on the same
farm, and has also been surrounded by licensing obligations (Dutfield 2008). Indeed, the
formerly implicit exemption is now enshrined in Article 15§2 of the 1991 UPOV
Convention, which states that “each Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder's
right in relation to any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes,
on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on
their own holdings, the protected variety”.
The wording clearly shows the shift in approach to the farmers’ exception, which
evolved into an optional exception to the exclusive rights of breeders, rather than an
array of actions considered outside the scope of the IP title in itself. Such restrictive
evolution has been indicated to be the source of the recognition of farmers’ rights
within the FAO system as a bundle of socio-economic rights including those related to
seed as such (as asserted by Article 9 of the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture, entered into force in 2004; Pelegrina and Salazar
2011). Landmark cases in the USA and Canada have reiterated that the farmers’ exception
should be interpreted in a narrow fashion vis-à-vis the sale of the protected-
varieties’ progeny (such as the ruling in Asgrow vs. Winterboer that identified
“brown-bagging” as a marketing practice violating modern United States’ legislation).
The European legislation has, in a parallel fashion, dressed the contours of farm-saved
seed quite restrictively, and especially conditioned the farmers’ privilege to the pay-
ment of “an equitable remuneration […] sensibly lower than the amount charged
for the licensed production of propagating material” in Article 14 of EC Regulation 2100/94
on Community Plant Variety Rights. This Article further imposes an information obli-
gation on the farmers and suppliers of processing services vis-à-vis farm-saved seed
quantities. Both national and European case-law has been built around the interpret-
ation of such terms, balancing the interests of farmers and those of breeders with those
human rights to privacy and avoiding abuse of rights on all accounts. National rulings
have for instance protected farmers’ interests against systematic invoicing for seeds that
are saved but not used for sowing or multiplication purposes, and against the gathering
of farm-saved-seed information without the consent of farmers. They also pointed
against potential abuse of rights through the lack of recourse to other available remedies
for information collection, and the invalidity of claims issued without any indication of
possible infringements, especially the intent to sow the product of the harvest for
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Saatgut (Case C-305/00, 10 April 2003). The French national order has in this regard
shown the strictest reaction to the privilege, establishing it solely with regards to wheat
through a voluntary compulsory contribution system and considering all other farm-saved
seed to be counterfeit, falling within the realm of law 2007–1544, dated 30th October
2007. These various legislative developments push oneself to question whether and to
what extent the farmers’ privilege should be recalibrated in order to maintain its initial
rationale and ensure the survival of mass selection endeavours.
The inherent concern of the PVP system vis-à-vis farmers is not omnipresent within
patent laws as such, as these statutes tend to remain abstract in their nature and are
therefore not designed to solely apply to agrobiodiversity-reliant innovations as PVP le-
gislation is, with its inevitable links to the loftier issues of food security or environmen-
tal protection. Certain countries have nonetheless equipped themselves with a number
of legislative tools in this regard, such as the case of European legal order and its
Directive 98/44/EC, making room for a farmers’ privilege in domestic patent systems in
its rather unusual Article 11§1, allowing farmers to retain material grown on their own
farms for subsequent years (Nenow 2001). While this instrument has no direct effect in
Member States’ national legal orders and allows for restrictions of these rights awarded
to farmers, it still acknowledges the specificity of the socio-technological innovation
system that is mass selection. Even though the so-called “Doha round” and its Minister-
ial Conventions have seemingly failed to fashion a viable consensus on the terms of a
new World Trade order, they have strengthened regulatory determination to include
such privilege within domestic patent regulation, leading for instance to the 2007
amendment of the Swiss Federal Patents Act so as to include a farmers’ privilege, lim-
ited to uses of the patented material within the same farm (Pires De Carvalho 2010).
The relatively rare recourse to the exception within patent legislation could be
entrenched in a textual TRIPS interpretation, in accord with which the recognition of
such a privilege to farmers might prejudice the legitimate interests of the monopoly
holders under Article 27 (Watal 2000). The feasibility and conformity of such excep-
tions in patent legislation has yet to be tested before the judiciary or the WTO
dispute-settlement mechanisms, but we believe that the flexibilities inherent in the
Agreement and its rationale allow for the recognition of the farmers’ exception.
Other commentators have in this regard highlighted the possibility that the existence
of compensation in return for the right to use, save and exchange the protected ma-
terial might actually encourage the doctrine of compulsory licensing, viewed as a
“statutory license”, rather than as a classical exception to IPR protection as grounded
in Article 30 of TRIPS (Garrison 2006). Furthermore, the reluctance to adopt formal
farmers’ privileges in patent laws themselves can be overturned through jurispruden-
tial liability thresholds, especially if plant-breeders’ rights recognise growers’ right to
save and exchange seeds, as established before Canadian courts. Even though the
patent-infringing canola farmer could not benefit from the privilege enshrined in
PVP legislation to save the seed, monetary compensation deriving from the infringe-
ment was overturned on the grounds that no financial or other benefit was generated
by the technology (Phillips 2007, analysing Monsanto vs. Schmeiser). This argument
could fuel the debate on the liability thresholds that might be introduced for re-use
conditions.
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The outlines of protection regimes for mass selection and landrace revival networks
should be assessed in general terms but also with due regard to national specificities, in
order to safeguard centuries-long seed-saving and exchange practices, distancing one-
self from the reductionist perception that farmers merely cultivate biodiversity devel-
oped off-farm by breeders. National regulatory frameworks should therefore consider
innovation stemming from mass selection as a parallel yet different (and not necessarily
derogatory), seed-production scheme, raising different predicaments than dominant
vertically integrated molecular plant breeding, and requiring incentives within a dual
sui generis system for both modern and farmers’ varieties. Such system, taking due ac-
count of national or regional stages of rural and economic development, may counter
the trend to limit mass selectors’ activities to the realm of exceptions, reducing farmer’s
privileges to a “basic trickle of rights” (Cullet 1999). At this stage, the different options
lie within seed marketing legislation on the one hand, where DUS requirements in cer-
tified seeds could either be relaxed, or derogatory ad hoc regimes for local varieties
may be established; and within IP legislation on the other, where the UPOV system
may be redesigned to allow for landrace protection and use, or where a set of minima-
listic double tier liability rules may be further put to use in order to compensate
farmers for the use of their varieties in commercial breeding programmes, relying per-
haps on a “light registry” to track varieties down, as developed below.
While intended to standardise crop names, protect consumers and foster investment
in breeding, existing mainstream certification legislation and market regulation have
had “the unintended consequence of drastically reducing the numbers of cultivars
grown and impinging on the ability of farmers to grow older varieties or landraces” that
do not fit within the formal seed market (Vetelainen et al. 2009). Alongside the rather
weighty choice of relaxing the formal system so as to include a wider array of plant var-
ieties and actors, the establishment of derogatory ad hoc regimes in the form of book
logs or flexible national (or regional) registers of uncertified seed could be options
worth considering. In Brazil, the recognition of mass selection operated for instance
solely through amendments of the seed marketing legislation in 2003, where landraces
or traditional varieties have found new legroom, notably through the possibility that
“family farmers” have been granted to register landraces in the National System of
Plants and Seeds. This registration includes specific criteria taking the cultural and
traditional aspects of the varieties into account, without prejudice to the exchange pos-
sibilities in the absence of such registration, since an official double exemption from
registration has also been foreseen (Santilli 2012). On the other hand, the establishment
of a derogatory “light catalogue” has been the way forward in the European legal order,
through Directives 2008/62 and 2009/145 on conservation varieties, to the dismay of
both commentators and politically active farmers’ associations (Anvar 2008). Several re-
search projects were funded through the FP6 European Research Framework, known as
Farm Seed Opportunities, in order to overcome the inherent difficulty of uniformly
regulating quite diverse farm-innovation systems. Targeted to support the implementa-
tion of seed regulations on conservation varieties, these projects also proposed comple-
mentary seed-regulation scenarios, the utility and effect of which may need further
consideration. To all intents and purposes, opening the Catalogue to conservation var-
ieties remains a means of reducing genetic erosion and preserving varietal heritage,
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main commercial system, and may potentially block completely open marketing possi-
bilities for non-ind ustrial models of agriculture such as organic farming or bio-
dynamics in light of additional administrative obligations (Bocci 2009).
In the absence of such “light catalogue” or a general exemption from certification,
and thus in absence of a legal recognition of seed exchange platforms, litigation be-
tween formal and informal seed market actors will prosper, as shown by the aforemen-
tioned French case opposing Kokopelli to Graines Baumaux. Referenced by the Court
of Nancy in February 2011 (Case C-59/11), the European Court of Justice needed to as-
sess whether seed catalogues violated principles of the acquis communautaire related
to the liberty of trade, free movement of goods, proportionality, equality and non-
discrimination, as well as the Union’s obligations under international law, especially
with regards to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the FAO International
Treaty. The opinion of Attorney General Kokott, issued on 19th January 2012, seemed
to indicate that the International Treaty did “not include any provisions which are un-
conditional and sufficiently precise as to challenge the validity of EU legislation on the
marketing of seeds”. However, in the light of the proportionality principle, “the disad-
vantages of the marketing prohibition, [which include a negative impact on the freedom
to conduct a business and agricultural biodiversity] manifestly outweigh its advantages”,
a disadvantage that is not sufficiently attenuated by the derogations carved out by Dir-
ective 2009/145. Indeed, the advocate general argues that the conservation varieties
Directive, by not giving “sufficient consideration to the interests of economic operators
and consumers”, does not allow for sufficient scope vis-à-vis the use of old varieties and
those products of mass selection, thereby concluding that “the prohibition on the sale
of seed of varieties that are not demonstrably distinct, stable and sufficiently uniform
[…] invalid as it infringes the principle of proportionality, the freedom to conduct a busi-
ness […], the free movement of goods […] and the principle of equal treatment”. The
judgment of the Court, issued on 12th July 2012, ran counter to the initial conclu-
sions set out by Attorney Kokott, by taking a rather positivist approach to the
principle of proportionality within the European acquis communautaire. In this re-
gard, the Court assessed whether the exclusion of non-distinct, stable and uniform
varieties from the formal seed market was appropriate for attaining the legitimate
objectives pursued by official catalogue legislation. These objectives were identified
as the increase of agricultural productivity and the reliability of the characteristics of
the seed, which were adequately pursued by the litigious measures, setting the
grounds of an efficient market without completely ruling out the marketing of old
varieties. The decision should be analysed in light of the fact that the conservation
varieties Directive was not in force at the beginning of the proceedings, although the
national Court has been invited to take account of such legislative development.
Indeed, the Luxembourg based Court seems to hint that the forced move of
Kokopelli into illegality and unfair competition has been remedied by the enactment
of this ad hoc regime. Were it to be the case, the imposition of geographical, quanti-
tative and packaging restrictions by the derogatory rules of the “conservation
varieties” catalogue would seemingly not undermine the recognition of mass selec-
tion efforts, according to the ECJ’s approach to the issue, although it might actually
minimise their impact in practice.
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remedied, a wider regulatory debate is also needed on the form of a reward regime for
the development and maintenance of farmers’ varieties, which would satisfy both mass
selectors and methodical breeders. The International Law Association Committee on
the International Law on Biotechnology suggests "examining whether the UPOV system
should be partly adapted and relaxed to allow protection of improved farmers' varieties
that result from controlled on-farm breeding processes" (ILA, International Law
Association 2010). However, amending principles related to protectable subject matter
in the current property paradigm would imply radical changes in rationale and attitude,
notably because of the inherently variable, non-uniform and collective nature of
farmers’ varieties (Correa 2000). Indeed, the subject matter requirements of the existing
strong-IPR approach relate to new and clearly distinguishable plant varieties, and thus
“often cannot accommodate the contributions of individual farmers using more infor-
mal methods to select for better crops or sought-after plant characteristics” (Helfer
2002). The recognition of biodiversity-related collective intellectual property rights in
the hands of local communities has, for instance, been pushed forward within the In-
dian legal order, within a system where property rights are shared with governmental
authorities in an attempt to fill the gap in perception and ensure compliance (Cullet
1999). If a parallel protection regime for uncertified farmer seeds is privileged, special
attention should thus be given to its contours, especially with regard to equity con-
cerns. Indeed, protection should only concern varieties in themselves, and not extend
to their genotype, as it should allow for the acknowledgement of the efforts lying be-
hind mass selection, which are often collective, while also reflecting on the adequacy of
the “exclusivity” approach within such communities, where open licensing and remu-
neration systems might prove better-fitted (Correa 2000). Indeed, regulators should
take notice that the allocation of exclusion rights to mass selectors refutes the rationale
upon which this rather unique partially open innovation system is built. Conversely,
the design of a reciprocal liability rules mechanism might prove effective in providing
compensation to selectors in case their varieties are used in commercial breeding pro-
grams and subsequently marketed. The aforementioned solution in seed marketing
legislation, i.e. the constitution of a “light registry for farmers’ varieties” could for in-
stance be the starting point of such a minimalist liability rules regime, providing not
only some artificial lead time but most importantly a modest royalty rate to be forfeited
by variety borrowers (Reichman 1994, 2000), similar to the “equitable remuneration”
perceived by patent or PVP right holders on farm-saved-seed. Such option would how-
ever need to contemplate the tricky issues of designating the rightful interlocutor, ad-
dressing whether similarity or “substantial difference” thresholds should be established
in the assessment of follow-on innovation, and whether litigation should be avoided
through mediation mechanisms, or whether compensation should be integrated into in-
stitutional frameworks such as participatory plant breeding schemes where contractual
reward for subsequent commercial use could be envisaged at the start of the project.
Ensuring the production of public goods that are the result of mass selection thus en-
tails a comprehensive fine-tuning of dominant intellectual property regulatory tools,
reconsidering the existing flexibilities aimed at in situ biodiversity conservation within
the strong paradigm. Mass selectors are not only pushed into illegality through the
shrinking practices of farm seed-saving, but also through the uniform regulation of the
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quality of seed circulating in markets and the seriousness of actors involved. The
farmers’ exception and those regulatory takes on farm-saved seed should be recali-
brated in PVP legislation and provided for in patent laws, while, most importantly, a
well-suited reward regime should be constructed to free mass selection and exchange
practices from the present illegality, thereby ensuring the maintenance and continuous
production of biological diversity upon which breeding programmes continue to rely.Controlled hybridisation
Incrementally sequential innovation on the margin of the strong IP paradigm
The development of science-based plant breeding is marked by the shift from uncon-
scious mass selection towards conscious rational attempts at adaptation, characterised
by the use of the Mendelian principles of heredity and segregation, which led to the
development of controlled hybridisation, relying upon inheritance-focused methodical
selection anchored to the phenotypic observation of plant varieties (Bowler 1989).
Through the lengthy empirical study of mutations obtained through deliberate crosses
of plant varieties, breeders can predict the advent of specific characteristics such as
drought resistance or fungal tolerance. A number of varieties may also notably outper-
form the parental lines used in their development, through the less-well-understood
principle of heterosis or hybrid vigour. It is mainly this phenomenon that has truly
transformed breeding into the “lucrative science” we observe today (Fowler 1994), as
the advantages conferred on new varieties by hybridisation methods cannot be repli-
cated in farmer-saved seed (Evenson 2005). Controlled hybridisation is characterised by
long cycles of research activity before the commercialisation of the end product (i.e. the
improved variety), with the initial two years of breeding programmes focusing on the
deliberate production of mutations and variety crosses. This is followed by the “lengthy
and tedious” selection stage, with six to eight years devoted to the examination of the
best recombination and stabilisation designs for the new variation (Van Den Hurk
2009). Acknowledging that "exotic germplasm" may at times make all the difference be-
tween competitors' similar products, conventional plant-breeding activities still rely
heavily on the largest possible gene pool of improved varieties, while successfully mar-
keted varieties constitute the backbone of conventional breeding programmes. Breeding
programmes are therefore heavily affected by the strengthening of intellectual property
rights through extensions of the scope of protection regimes and ever-growing limita-
tions surrounding the possibility of re-using the protected product, process or variety.
In order to balance and better enforce the PVP system and provide more exclusivity
through a tougher stance on “plagiaristic breeding”, a novel concept, that of essential
derivation was developed in 1991 to extend the range of acts that would require a
breeder’s authorisation. The 1961 and 1978 acts were deemed insufficient for this pur-
pose in the light of the globalised industry’s needs (Wendt and Izquierdo 2001), in
order "to prevent converted lines from infringing and pirating breeder's genetic mater-
ial" (ISF, International Seed Federation 2005). Under UPOV 1991, the necessity to ne-
gotiate a licensing agreement not only emerged in cases where the protected variety's
use in a breeding programme led to the commercialisation of a new variety that is not
clearly distinguishable, but also in cases of an "essentially derived variety" (EDV),
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expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or the combin-
ation of genotypes of the initial variety" (Article 14 paragraph 5 of the 1991 UPOV Act).
The trigger point for authorisation thereby shifted from distinctiveness to the determin-
ation of essential characteristics. The main challenge faced by conventional plant
breeders in this regard relates to the shrinking room for manoeuvre left for the use of
protected material in breeding programmes. Even though the “absolute permission
rules” still delineate informational property titles (in accordance with which the permis-
sion of the monopoly-owner ought to be sought for using the protected information),
liability rules (whereby the entitlement can be used without permission so long as ad-
equate compensation is granted later), embody the specificity of cumulative plant-
breeding innovation through the unequivocal breeders’ exemption of PVP legislation
(Merges 2001). The concept of essential derivation was not designed to weaken such
exemption, but rather to fight plagiarism. However, the wording's vagueness, as well as
the interpretation it received in practice as a tool to be used against all varieties tenu-
ously resembling and thus directly competing with the "initial variety", meant that it
bore the perilous risk of reducing the nature of statutory undeniable-use exemptions.
Such an extension retains a disquieting potential as a weapon to shut down or delay
competitors possessing potentially better-performing yet dangerously similar products
(such as the relatively constrained Mediterranean market for brown tomatoes for in-
stance), rather than trying to identify infringers, thereby creating unnecessary and un-
productive hostility within an innovation chain that is bound to create similarly derived
products. Therefore, with little consensus over the genetic conformity threshold re-
quired to activate this extensive protection granted to cosmetic modifications, the EDV
addition could be detrimental to small-scale breeders (Narasimhan and Robinson
2008). Rather than granting breeders more protection, the new balance found in the
international breeders' rights legislation might thus overlook the role of liability rules
embedded within the breeders’ exception in the successful use of agrobiodiversity on
farm and other small breeding programmes.
In parallel to such newfound reach in PVP legislation, conventional breeders increas-
ingly began to be confronted with an unfamiliar and strong legal entitlement, i.e. pat-
ents, where relatively restricted room has traditionally been awarded to follow-on use
possibilities vis-à-vis protected innovations, especially in active breeding programmes.
Indeed, patent legislation worldwide extremely rarely provides for exceptions to exclude
third parties with specific respect to research conducted within the protection
innovation, or to breeding. However, companies that still generate their income from
plant-variety licensing, sale or distribution, rather than patented biotechnology research
tools or process licenses, continue to unreservedly rely on the accessible nature of both
improved and exotic agricultural biodiversity (Louwaars et al. 2009). The restrictions
stemming from strong rules of appropriation with regard to the accessibility of im-
proved genetic material, while preserving the positive prospect of royalty income, may
also hamper the sacrosanct “freedom to operate” that breeders long for. Increased op-
portunities for exclusion, granted at the phenotypic level through plant-variety rights
and at the genotypic level through patents, cannot thus wholeheartedly be considered
as vehicles for fostering innovation with respect to plant improvement. This leads to a
partial paradigm breakdown with regard to conventional plant-breeding activities in
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cially in the European continent, to the recognition of a breeders' exemption within pa-
tent law, and for an extension of the existing exemption under UPOV-like plant-variety
protection to the commercialisation stage, coupled with the calls for better defined and
balanced public/private research partnerships, show the existing disquiet about the fu-
ture of all agricultural research and development.
Models responding to the paradigm breakdown for controlled hybridisation
The tensions that have arisen “between first generation breeders who have secured legal
protection for new varieties and second generation breeders who seek to utilise those
new varieties to develop more varieties” need to be duly addressed so as to continue to
permit second generation innovators to engage in the production of public goods
(Helfer 2002). The breeders’ exemption, which stands out as an efficient prior user
right that could be associated to an ex ante liability rule operating under a “take now,
pay later” understanding codified so as to allow both the use of protected material and
the compensation of the initial plant breeder (Merges 2001; Burk 2009) should be advo-
cated further, as a response to the shortcomings of the strong IPR approach. The threat
to such an exemption in PVP systems should be carefully addressed, notably in the
light of the EDV concept, and also of the inevitable co-existence of PVP with patents
on the same material or within the product development chain as a whole.
The contribution and opportunity of a breeders’ exemption in patent regulation
should be further assessed in the light of the characteristics of the technology develop-
ment mechanism. While those breeders' exemptions recognising immediate rights over
protected material for further use in breeding programmes remain the absolute founda-
tion of plant-variety-rights protection worldwide, these remain scarce in patent legisla-
tion. Under the tight-lipped TRIPS framework and the worryingly mute European
Directive, merely a handful of national legal orders allow for breeding-specific research
possibilities outside negotiated licenses. In Germany, France and Switzerland (and
probably soon in the Netherlands), the infamous PVP breeder’s exemption has found
its echo in patent legislation, where breeding programmes could be initialised, even
when the material contained patented traits, the consent of the patent holder needing
to be sought at the commercialisation stage. As a result of this exception, breeders may
indeed use the protected variety in their crop genetic improvement activities (in ac-
cordance with the characteristics of science-based plant breeding discussed above),
relying on constant and unconditional access to improved germplasm found in the
market to generate socially, economically or environmentally interesting new agrobiodi-
versity on the basis of existing genetic variability. The lack of consent from the rights
holder for carrying out active commercial research using the innovation is at first sight
quite a positive departure from traditional patent protection, but its efficiency still
needs to be tested (Blakeney 2011). Early indicators show that such flexibility has, in
practice, resulted in hostile reactions from competitors wishing to shut down ongoing
research activities (PLANTUM Dutch Breeders' Association 2009). There are also ex-
tremely heated discussions on the extent that the breeders’ exception should have in
practice, and the trigger point where licensing negotiations would need to be under-
taken, if the patented element should still be present at the stage of commercialisation
or not. Furthermore, due attention should also be given to these negotiated licensing
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forming or adapted varieties, is distributed and not locked out by unacceptable condi-
tions set out in a highly competitive marketplace.Molecular biology upstream research tools
Upstream research tools for plant breeding on the margin of the strong IP paradigm
Scientific breakthroughs achieved up to the middle of the 20th century in genomics sci-
ence by brilliant minds such as Alfred Hershey, Martha Chase, James Watson and
Francis Crick with regard to the role and structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (more
commonly known as DNA, a molecule discovered as early as 1869) have revolutionised
the agricultural research and development cycle through the development of biotech-
nology and molecular biology tools. A far-reaching term, "biotechnology" covers an
extremely wide range of innovations, including industrial fermentation and modern,
post-DNA-discovery genetic engineering, and has expanded the science of plant breed-
ing through very efficient novel screening tools and variety development techniques. In
doing so it has altered once again the management of agrobiodiversity in terms of con-
servation and use possibilities, as well as the landscape of actors involved. Research
tools that arose on account of the infusion of molecular biology into plant-breeding sci-
ence constitute the new core of crop-genetic improvement, as an indispensable input
for further research, side by side with both improved and exotic crop varieties that rep-
resent the operational background of crop-related research. Indeed, tools such as mo-
lecular markers, high-density genetic maps and structured mapping of populations
provide breeders with the ability to "simultaneously define gene action and breeding
value at hundreds of loci distributed relatively uniformly across entire genomes"
(Moose and Munn 2008). The position of such research tools, as the groundwork of
the innovation process in modern agricultural biotechnology, whether applied to con-
ventional plant breeding or to transgenics, elevates the conditions surrounding their
appropriation and further use to an essential issue.
Like the pressures and research needs which propelled the creation of the SNP Con-
sortium with regard to the Human Genome, crop improvement research has also relied
on partially-open institutions for the development of determinant molecular research
tools. Rice research provides a useful example, demonstrating that, while patents lead
to gains in terms of research efficiency and time, the existence of patent protection for
the direct products of research is not a precondition for private sector involvement in
innovation, while partially open information may also represent a prerequisite for fur-
ther research and innovation within the world of high-sunk-cost bound specialised bio-
technology research. Sequencing efforts are remarkable since the direct raw output of
research activities is not subject to patent protection, while their potential impact on
further research remains immense, especially with respect to the rice genome, viewed
as the "Rosetta stone of cereals". Indeed, rice allows greater insight into the genetics of
grasses and all major cereals, such as maize, barley or wheat; which are sizable com-
mercial markets compared to the seemingly less lucrative rice market itself (Normile
and Pennisi 2002). Map-based sequence information improves our knowledge of the lo-
cation of all the genes in a genome, thereby extending the usefulness of molecular-
marking technology, gaining in both accuracy and efficiency (Sasaki and Burr 2000),
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interest (Moose and Munn 2008). It thus constitutes an essential instrument for pre-
liminary mandatory research in molecular plant breeding and transgenics. However,
without further research aimed at the isolation and better understanding of a simply
mapped pair of gene sequences, as well as strong arguments as to their precise utility
and their detailed linkage to important crop traits, monopoly rights would typically not
be granted over such a product (Pray and Naseem 2005).
The absence of intellectual property rights at the immediate end of the research and
development chain did not preclude private investment in the map sequencing of the
rice genome. Even though patents could theoretically have protected the entire array of
tools that the rice-genome mapping research relied upon, a number of them remained
in practice unpatented. The publicly available nature of such research tools has
therefore also be seen as an important driver for innovation in terms of upstream
molecular-biology research. Indeed, both the unpatented sequencing technologies de-
veloped by Frederick SANGER and Walter GILBERT, and the early public molecular
markers, such as RFLPs (restriction fragment length polymorphisms), remain central to
"automated genomic research" (Pray and Naseem 2005). The particularly interesting
research collaboration that is the International Rice Genome Sequencing project (as
well as other international attempts at sequencing) demonstrates that socially useful
innovation may not only be achieved and sufficiently incentivised through partially-
open information systems, but that it actually also heavily relies on such partial open
mechanisms, since all parties recognise the role played by unpatented sequencing tech-
nology and access to other research teams' provisional research results in achieving the
final objective of the international project.
However, the potential disregard or overlook of adequate rules of diffusion below the
fence of raw research data still ought to be carefully considered. Within the framework
of hybrid upstream research streams, while the data produced by consortiums and
some selected research tools remains within the public domain, research efforts that
aim to single out the exact utility of molecular biology research tools may lead to pa-
tent protection over what unvaryingly consists of platform technologies, to which a
solid door of closed access shall be maintained. Within these hostile innovation
environments, anti-commons emerge, characterised by the under-use and thus the
under-production of innovative technologies, pushing legal scholarship to deplore the
inappropriateness of such a restrictive approach to proprietary exclusiveness (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). Notably, the patent estate relating to the engineering and use of zinc-
finger proteins, a technology that enables scientists to bind virtually any DNA sequence
of interest, was initially owned by several different companies and academic institu-
tions, a situation that raised concerns as to the prohibitive costs faced by subsequent
users and developers in the negotiation of multiple licenses. This example is a classic
scenario of the so-called “patent anti-commons” (Chandrasekharan et al. 2009). An-
other example is the controversy that surrounds research concerned with crop-variety
genome mapping, much like the widely-cited example of the Human Genome and the
uproar caused by the "Craig Venter" intellectual property protection strategy pattern
in the mid 1990’s. Overall, the high number of patents on upstream molecular research
tools, their concentration in the hands of small groups of enterprises, their alleged
broad scope, the restrictive licensing practices (which drive away the innovation's
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indeed be cited as a cumulative rationale for assertions regarding the hindrance of
socially desirable research and development.
Models responding to the partial paradigm breakdown for molecular breeding tools
Several options remain at hand to respond to the partial paradigm breakdown of plant
breeding activities relying on molecular research tools, which yearn for a slice of par-
tially open innovation structure. Alongside ad hoc institutional collaborations retaining
a hybrid and semi-open nature, as epitomised by the aforementioned Rice Genome
Sequencing project, regulatory provisos allowing for the development of the increasingly
crucial molecular research tools can be found within the IP paradigm, more specifically in
the recognition of a broad research exception in patent protection. The design of a specific
regime for platform technologies can also be foreseen, ensuring their diffusion either
through extensive yet well-defined statutory-use conditions, or through licensing protocols,
intervening directly at the level of innovation diffusion. Indeed, an internationally recog-
nised wide-reaching academic research exemption for biological research tools might not,
according to certain commentators, properly discourage universities' institutional adminis-
trators from pursuing strong exclusive rights and licensing strategies (Lei et al. 2009).
Legal solutions have in this context been primarily based upon liability regimes, mod-
erating the risks of excluding third parties from accessing the technologies. Exemptions
surrounding the grant of proprietary rights, namely for the purposes of research and
experimental use, indeed not only acknowledge the derivate nature of conventional and
molecular plant breeding activities, but also emphasise the reliance, production and
conservation of agricultural biodiversity entailed within such particular research. In
parallel to the official recognition of the breeders' exceptions within the international
legal ethos, liability rules related to experimental uses in patent protection are recog-
nised in the TRIPS Agreements' Article 30, whereby “Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions
do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties.” This quasi-universal principle and its limita-
tions leave non-negligible details to national or regional regulatory or jurisprudential
fine-tuning. Indeed, even though both developed and developing countries alike have
included an exception to patent protection for experimental use, based on the premise
that the prevention of such use would frustrate the purpose of patent disclosure (Misati
and Adachi 2010), this trend, and especially its reach, is nowhere universal.
The contours of the exception indeed show quite substantial differences in national
legal orders, pertaining first to the question of the acts for which authorisation might
not be sought (covering either research on, or extending up to research with, the
innovation), while taking the researcher's purpose into account. For instance, a large
number of countries, including the United States, operate a clear distinction between
non-commercial research activities, which fall under the exception, and commercial en-
deavours, which require authorisation from the patent owner. However, delineating
commercial and non-commercial research has proven to be a tricky and sensitive issue,
opening jurisprudential debates on the merits of infringement claims (Misati and Adachi
2010). In the EU, common regional standards include Article 27 (b) Community Patent
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search exception, stating that "the right conferred by a Community Patent does not extend to
acts done for experimental purposes relating to subject matter of the patented invention", but
are also supplemented by national specificities and show quite the range of discrepancies.
All EU Members, except Austria, indeed followed suit by using the exact wording of the
Convention, while the Netherlands adopted somewhat narrower wording, and Belgium took
the road of a broad research exception, covering both acts done with and on the protected
innovation (Van Overwalle 2006).
In absence of legal constraints and/or in presence of a too narrow statutory exception
for research undertaken with protected molecular research tools, an alternative
solution might reside within the encouragement of formal agreements between institu-
tions based upon partially-open innovation systems, discouraging the patenting of up-
stream research tools while fostering their common development and use. With regard
to negotiated uses on the other hand, the navigation of licensing practices should be
facilitated and universalised through pro-rata protocols including provisions against
royalty stacking or even prefabricated licensing provisions encompassing ex post com-
pensatory liability rules. In this respect the potential lying within an automatic, royalty-
free license for research purposes in cases where the protected research tool is not
made available on the market through a product or tool kit can be explored (Barton
and Berger 2001), drawing perhaps from experiences with compulsory licensing
mechanisms. The adjustment of existing rights and obligations between technology
developers, holders and users, and the necessity to foster innovation while maintain-
ing access to information and scientific progress, calls for a swift and equitable
tailoring of license terms. The molecular plant-breeding innovation chain retains
certain particularities that are difficult to capture within traditional IP tools, since
there are often multiple types of protection surrounding a single product, whether at
the actual physical level of possession of patented genetic-construct components
such as promoters, or at the informational level of trademarked breeding methods or
molecular markers.Conclusion
This paper has explored the effectiveness of the strong intellectual property paradigm
to create incentives for innovation in the field of food and agricultural research, relying
on massive inputs of plant-genetic resources into the research and development cycle.
The main lesson is that there is not a single regime that fits all contexts best at the
same time. The strong paradigm has proven very effective in the context of genetic en-
gineering, but faces a systematic paradigm breakdown when it extends its regulatory
scope over traditional mass selection operating for example in exchange networks of
farmers’ landraces, where innovation often has a more collective, community-related
nature. In these cases, a different form of intellectual-property protection, based on
partially-open innovation systems, has proven more effective, even though its very
existence is threatened by the global prevalence of the strong intellectual property
paradigm, pushed into forced illegality and faced with significant disregard for the
products of the innovation process. Genetic engineering and mass selection with
naturally occurring landraces present two extreme cases.
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between the two extremes of simple observation and deep molecular introspection.
Conventional breeding, characterised by controlled hybridisation, and based upon the
methodically-controlled crossing of specific varieties with other plant-genetic material,
implies the repeated input of vast amounts of plant-genetic material, both from the
pool of already domesticated varieties and from wild-plant genetic resources. Similarly,
the use of molecular-biology-based gene marker technologies or bio-informatics to em-
power conventional breeding techniques is built around a process of cumulative incre-
mental innovation, where the outputs of the research are used in turn as the direct
inputs for the next innovation cycle. For these intermediary categories of plant im-
provement systems, both overly strong intellectual property rights and the absence of
well delineated intellectual-property protection fail to provide incentives for investing
in follow-on innovations. In particular, in cases where access to plant-genetic resources
is a basic requirement to each new product development cycle, overly strong intellec-
tual property rights might hamper or slow down the innovation process due to in-
creased transaction costs generated by the need for complex licensing schemes for the
use of these resources. Further, due to the interdependence of developed and develop-
ing countries for access to genetic resources for food and agriculture – for example sit-
uated in biodiversity hotspots in the South – special attention is required to create
investment in genetic resources by countries that are situated far from the innovation
frontier and which are less well placed to obtain and enforce strong intellectual
property rights. Intellectual property rights legislation ought in this regard be recali-
brated so as to incorporate farmers’ needs and rights, all the while constructing a
well-suited reward regime to maintain adequate levels of genetic diversity that are
not only important for farmers’ livelihoods or for environmental conservation
policies, but also for the future of agricultural research and development efforts
worldwide. As can be seen from the analysis in this article, neither strong intellectual
property rights, nor their complete absence have proven an optimal fit from a legal
and economic point view for the two intermediary categories of cumulative incre-
mental innovation in agriculture research.
Finally, this conclusion leads us to recognise the role played by other arguments,
beyond the legal analysis of optimal fit, when making regulatory decisions for inter-
mediary categories of cumulative incremental innovation. Broader collective decisions
on investments in the organisational and institutional infrastructures in scientific re-
search will play a role in the choice of the most adequate legal framework for
agrobiodiversity-based innovation in a given society. For instance, broader societal
choices to be made for tackling the challenges posed by climate change for world-food
security, may lead to decisions to increase investment in transgenic technologies de-
veloped either by private sector entities or by the public sector if granted sufficient
funds to do so. It could also lead to increased investment in global collaboration be-
tween both public and private research institutions for experimental breeding, as a
way to tackle these challenges. This paper does not advocate one or the other of
these positions, but it does point to the fact that the choice of the best regulatory
regime for agricultural biodiversity based innovation in a given society will depend
on such broader debate, beyond the technical analysis of the legal and economic
rationale alone.
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